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MATTHEWS V. EVATT
105 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1997)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
LuciaAimar was shot and killed on the evening of October 29, 1984
in Charleston, South Carolina. On the night of the murder, Aimar and her
boyfriend, Eric Burn, were eating dinner in a parked car in a lot next to
a drive-through restaurant. They were approached by Earl Matthews Jr.,
who robbed them and shot both Aimar and Burn, fatally wounding
Aimar. 1
A jury convicted Matthews of capital murder under § 16-320(C)(a)(1)(e) of the South Carolina Code for murder in the commission
of armed robbery. The jury sentenced Matthews to death. On direct
appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed his conviction, but
vacated his death sentence due to a violation of Skipper v. South
Carolina.2 The case was remanded for a new sentencing trial.3
On remand, Matthews was once again sentenced to death by the
jury. This time, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the
sentence. 4 Matthews petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a
5
writ of certiorari. The petition was denied.
On August 24, 1992, Matthews filed an application for postconviction relief, which was denied by the state trial court. The Supreme
Court of South Carolina denied discretionary review. The Supreme
Court of the United States denied Matthews's second petition for a writ
of certiorari on May 31, 1994.6
Matthews then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on August
30, 1994. The district court adopted the magistrate's report and denied
Matthews's petition after de novo review of the record. 7 Matthews
appealed, raising claims of racial discrimination by the prosecution, 8
racial discrimination by the prosecution during voir dire, 9 ineffective
assistance of counsel, 10 and a violation of his right to a fair trial caused
by the sentencing judge's refusal to submit to voir dire.11
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, finding
no error in the record, affirmed the district court's denial of Matthews's
12
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

1Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1997).
2 476 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1986) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments are violated where sentencing court refuses to admit
evidence of the defendant's adaptability to prison, including pretrial
incarceration).
3 State v. Matthews, 353 S.E.2d 444, 450 (S.C. 1986).
4State v. Matthews, 373 S.E.2d 587, 596 (S.C. 1988).
5 Matthews v. South Carolina,489 U.S. 1091 (1989).
6 Matthews v. South Carolina,511 U.S. 1138 (1994).
7
Matthews, 105 F.3d at 910.
8Id.
9
1d. at 917.
10
d. at 919.
1I Id. at 921.
12 Id. at 922. Matthews also claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel underStricklandv.Washington,466 U.S. 668 (1984). He alleged
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
I.

Claim of Racial Discrimination by Prosecutor Procedurally
Barred

Matthews raised a claim ofprosecutorial abuse of discretion, based
upon an assertion that the Commonwealth sought the death penalty in a
racially discriminatory manner. The court of appeals held that this claim
against Charles Condon, a state prosecutor, now Attorney General of
South Carolina, was procedurally barred because Matthews failed to
raise it in state court. 13 The court's discussion of default is important
because it illustrates the current highly technical nature of procedural
bars upheld by the Fourth Circuit.
The court in Matthews based its decision on the premise that the
state court has an interest in having the first opportunity to consider
alleged constitutional violations occurring in the defendant's state trial
and sentencing. Accordingly, Matthews was required to "exhaust" all of
his state remedies before seeking relief in federal district court. The court
stated that a federal habeas court will consider only those claims which
have been "fairly presented" to the state courts. The court then defined
"fairly presented" as those claims in which "both the operative facts and
14
the 'controlling legal principles' [were] presented to the state court."
The court ruled that Matthews had not exhausted his prosecutorial
abuse of discretion claim for two reasons. First, the court ruled that it had
not been presented to the Supreme Court of South Carolina. Second, the
claim presented to the state court was different than his claim presented
on appeal. The court viewed Matthews's state claim as a "very broad
assertion" that the South Carolina Death Penalty Statute was in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause because the prosecutor was given too
mtzh discretion in seeking the death penalty. The court reasoned that this
claim was substantively different from Matthews's claim before the
court of appeals that the prosecutor had abused his discretion by seeking
15
the death penalty on racially motivated grounds.
The Matthews court required the petitioner to express the claim
exactly as it was expressed at state court. Although Matthews's claim
was closely related, the court ruled it was a different claim and, therefore,

failed to investigate and present evidence that he lived in a lead contaminated house which resulted in his brain damage. The court ruled that
Matthews's claim failed the Stricklandineffective assistance of counsel
standard. Matthews, 105 F.3d at 920.
13 Id. at 912. The federal district court had found the claim was not
barred because it was raised and denied in a pretrial motion. Matthews
argued in his pretrial motion that the South Carolina death penalty statute
was unconstitutional and violated the Equal Protection Clause by giving
the prosecutor "'the complete and unbridled discretion in the first
instance as to whether the death penalty will be sought in any particular
case."' Id. at 912 n.2. The Fourth Circuit disagreed because Matthews
had not presented the claim in his pretrial motion to the Supreme Court
of South Carolina and, in any event, the court found that the claim in the
pretrial motion was different from the one being urged at federal habeas.
14 1d. at 911 (citing Verdin v. O'Leary,972 F.2d 1467,1474 (7th Cir.
1992) (quoting Picardv. Connor,404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971))).
15 Id. at 912.
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not exhausted. 16 This requirement is becoming more common in Virginia cases. It is employed by both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme
Court of Virginia to avoid deciding claims on their merits.
Virginia courts, in fact, haverecently extended theboundaries of the
"not the same claim" basis for default. 17 In Goins v. Commonwealth,18
the Supreme Court of Virginia held that two of Goins's claims were
defaulted on appeal because a different argument was made on appeal
than had been made at trial. The Goins court relied on Virginia Supreme
Court Rule 5:25 to support its decision. 19 Rule 5:25 states that "[e]rror
will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court or the commission
before which the case was initially tried unless the objection was stated
with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling." 20 The requirement,
therefore, is reasonable certainty when an objection is made. The rule
does riot state that any variation in the initial objection will lead to
default on appeal. 21 Goins demonstrates the new spin the Supreme Court
of Virginia is currently putting on procedural default.
Similarly, in Clagett v. Commonwealth,22 the Supreme Court of
Virginia employed the same "default twist" used in Goins.In Clagett,the
court held that the petitioner's assignment oferror had been procedurally
defaulted because a different argument was used on appeal than that used
at trial. As in Goins, the court in Clagett somehow interpreted Rule 5:25
as a requirement that counsel advance the exact same argument on appeal
as that advanced at trial.23
24
The Matthews court relied principally on Picard v. Connor,
though that case is not the only one providing guidance on the extent to
which a claim must have been presented "face-up" to the state court. The
Supreme Court of the United States, in Picard,stressed the importance
of the exhaustion policy, 25 which is codified in the federal habeas
statute. 26 Reasons for the exhaustion policy include federal-state comity
and the interest of the state in hearing a petitioner's claims. The Court
emphasized the rule that claims must be "fairly presented" to the state
court, requiring "a state prisoner to present the state courts with the same
claim he urges upon the federal courts." 27
The Court found that Picard had defaulted his equal protection
claim, not because he had altered the factual allegations put before the
trial court, but because he did not expressly frame the issue as a federal
Equal Protection Clause claim. The Court held that Picard was not
required to cite "book and verse" the federal constitution. The Court

16 In Virginia cases, failure to exhaust is the functional equivalent
of default.
17 For a comprehensive treatment of this subject, see Cooper, The
Never!Ending Story: Combating ProceduralBars in Capital Cases,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
18251 Va. 442,470 S.E.2d 114 (1996).
19 Goins, 251 Va. at 463, 470 S.E.2d at 129.
20
Va. Sup. Ct. R. 5:25.
21 For an in-depth analysis of default in Goins,see case summary of
Goins, Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p.44 (1996).
22252 Va. 79, 472 S.E.2d 263 (1996).
23
Clagett,252 Va. at 85-86, 472 S.E.2d at 266-67, see also case
summary of Clagett,Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1,p. 4 8 (1996).
24404 U.S. 270 (1971).
25
Id. at 275.
2628 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(c).
27
Picard,404 U.S. at 275-76.
28
Id. at 278.
29 For a further discussion of procedural bars, see, Cooper, The
Never Ending Story: Combating ProceduralBars in Capital Cases,
Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
30484 U.S. 400 (1988).
31
Id. at 406-07 n.9.

ruled, however, that "the substance ofa federal habeas corpus claim must
first be presented to the state courts."' 28 This requirement is not as strict
as that set out in Goins, Clagett, and Matthews where the court is
requiring the exact language used at trial, not merely the same substance
29
of the issue, to avoid procedural default.
The United States Supreme Court has also been more forgiving on
this question. In Taylor v. Illinois,30 the petitioner made a Sixth Amendment compulsory process claim when the court barred testimony of a
defense witness. At trial and on direct appeal, Taylor never mentioned the
Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause, but two of the Illinois
cases that he cited on direct appeal did refer to and cite United States
Supreme Court compulsory clause cases. The Taylor Court found this
31
citation was enough to present the federal claim to the Illinois court.
32
However, in Duncan v. Henry, the Court cited Picardfor the
proposition that a defendant seeking federal habeas relief must clearly
assert his claim as a federal constitutional violation at the trial level. Even
if the defendant makes a factual allegation that would support a due
process claim, it is important to identify the claim specifically as one
33
arising under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
Justice Stevens, in his dissent inDuncan,stated that Picardrequired
the defendant to state the substance of his federal claim. According to
Stevens, Picardmade it clear that "the prisoner need not place the c orrec t
label on his claim, or even cite the Federal Constitution, as long as the
substance of the federal claim has been fairly presented."'34 Stevens
criticized the new rule set out inDuncan as "hypertechn-cal and unwise,"
leading to lengthy litigation absent any valid purpose. Stevens reasoned
that "[i]f the state courts have considered and rejected such a claim on
state-law grounds, nothing is to be gained by requiring the prisoner to
present the same claim under a different label to the same courts who
'35
have already found it insufficient."
Although Stevens's rationale may be of some rhetorical help in
instances where controlling state law is identical to federal law on the
issue, his view has notprevailed. Accordingly, every effort mustbe made
to conform exactly to Virginia's procedural requirements. Also, because
of the holding in Duncan, defense counsel should assert a claim on every
conceivable ground, broadly and narrowly at trial and on appeal, to avoid
default. 36

32

115 S.Ct. 887 (1995).
Id.at 888.
34
1d.
35
Id.at 889.
36
TheMatthews court also rejected other bases urged by Matthews
for avoiding default:
1.The court held that Matthews's claim was not exhausted under the
South Carolina rule of infavorem vitae review (in favor of life). Under
this type of review, the Supreme Court of South Carolina reviews "'the
entire record for legal error, and assume[s] error when unobjected-to-but
technically improper arguments.., are asserted by the defendant on
appeal in demand for reversal or a new trial. "'Matthews, 105 F.3d at 912
(citation omitted). Infavorem vitae review, however, does not exist in
Virginia.
2. Based on Beam v. Paskett,3 F.3d 1301 (9th Cir. 1993), Matthews
argued that the South Carolina court must have passed on his racial
discrimination claim when it conducted mandatory review of sentencing
for "any arbitrary factor." The Fourth Circuit held that even if the
reasoning in Beam were adopted, the claim did not appear in the record,
could not have been decided as part of the statutory review, and,
therefore, was defaulted. 105 F.3d at 915. Although Idaho, the state
involved in Beam, South Carolina, and Virginia all contain essentially
the same language in their statutorily mandated review, using Beam in
33
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II. A Better-Batson Claim
Matthews also claimed that the prosecutor violated Batson v.
Kentucky37 by using all of his peremptory challenges to exclude five
black prospective jurors. Evaluating aBatsonclaim involves a three part
test. First, the party asserting the Batson claim must make out a prima
facie case of discrimination. Second, if the prima facie case is made, the
burden shifts to the party being accused of the Batson violation to
advance a racially neutral explanation for the challenge to the prospective juror. Finally, if parts one and two are met, the trial court must
determine whether the party asserting the Batson violation has proven
38
purposeful discrimination.
The prosecutor in Matthews claimed that the five black prospective
jurors were struck for the following reasons: Carl Ellis because he had a
criminal record and stated that he would follow the Lord's advice on
deciding whether to impose the death penalty; Nellie Frazier because she
was the mother of a state law enforcement official who was a friend of
a prospective state witness; Joe Ann Hunt because she had been convicted of check fraud numerous times; Patricia Middleton because she
was unsure whether she could impose the death penalty; and Rebecca
McDonald because she lived on the same street as the defendant and
knew his family. 39 The lower court found the explanations acceptable,
and the Fourth Circuit agreed.
Under Purkett v. Elem,40 the conclusion that the prosecutor's
reasons for striking these prospective jurors were racially neutral is
unremarkable. In Purkett, the United States Supreme Court held that the
second step of Batson "does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible."' 4 1 For a prosecutor to violate step two in Batson,
the discriminatory intent must be inherent in the prosecutor's justification. 42
However, Matthews's counsel did not simply rely on a challenge to
the race neutrality of the prosecutor's justification. Counsel went further
by claiming that similarly situated white jurors were not struck. The court
dismissed this claim by stating that "Batsonis not violated whenever two
veniremen of different races provide the same responses and one is
excused and the other is not." 43 The court reasoned that counsel is
entitled to consider the characteristics, tone, demeanor, and facial ex44
pressions ofprospective jurors when exercising peremptory challenges.
The court's interpretation, carried to its logical extreme, would
result in no twojurors ever being similarly situated and would effectively
preclude any successful equal protection claim. Nevertheless, it is

Virginia to avoid procedural default may not be advisable respecting
some claims. Please contact the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse if
this is an issue in your case.
3. Finally, the court noted that Matthews's procedural default would
be forgiven if he could prove cause for the default, actual prejudice that
would result from the alleged violation, a "fundamental miscarriage of
justice" if the claim was not considered, or evidence that he was actually
innocent of the death penalty. The court dealt with this briefly by stating
that Matthews had proven none of these. 105 F.3d at 916.
37476 U.S. 79 (1986).
38
Matthews, 105 F.3d at 917.
39
1d. at 917-18.
40 115 S.Ct. 1769 (1995).
41 Id. at 1771.
42
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97.
43
Matthews, 105 F.3d at 918.
44
1d.

advised that defense counsel follow the path taken in Matthews, go
beyond challenging explanations, and be alert to claims based on
disparate treatment of similarly situated prospective jurors.45
III. Refusal of Judge to Submit to Voir Dire
Matthews also claimed that the trial judge's refusal to submit to voir
dire violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Matthews made a
motion requesting that the sentencing judge submit to voir dire on issues
regarding the judge's attitude toward the death penalty in general;
whether death was appropriate in Matthews's case; what public statements the judge may have made on the death penalty; whether he, while
a member of the legislature, voted on legislation concerning the death
penalty; whether the judge had any connection with the victim's family;
whether he had any knowledge of the case that would effect his decision
on the proper penalty; and whether the judge could consider a sentence
46
of life imprisonment based on the facts of Matthews's case.
The sentencing judge answered some of Matthews's questions, but
then refused to answer any further questions on the grounds that a judge
is required to be impartial, and, therefore, voir dire is unnecessary. The
Matthews court held that there is no authority requiring ajudge to submit
to voir dire and that recusal procedures are available for a biased judge.
The court concluded that Matthews's right to a fair trial was not
violated. 47
Although Matthews's claim was denied, it demonstrated good trial
strategy because a defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial judge under
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 48 Further, the
increased politicization of judges related to capital cases increases the
chance that this fundamental right will be denied. 49
IV. Equal Protection Revisited
Both Matthews's defaulted "racial discriminatory abuse of discretion" claim and his Batson claims were grounded in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the first claim, Matthews
proffered evidence of specific racist acts alleged to have been committed
by Condon, inside and outside the courtroom. 50
Swain v. Alabama,5 1 the precursor to Batson, makes such evidence
relevant. In Swain, the United States Supreme Court stated that the denial
of prospective black jurors "on account of race" violated the Equal
Protection Clause.52 The Court held that there is a presumption that the

45

For a discussion of this and other means ofmaking more effective
use of Batson, see Rice and Youell, TowardMoreEffective Use ofBatson
in VirginiaCapital Trials, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
46
Matthews, 105 F.3d at 921.
47
Id. at 922.
48 For a more in-depth analysis of the need for an impartial judge,
see DelPrete, Not Holding the BalanceNice, Clearand True: The Right
to an Impartial Judge, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 47
(1995).
49 For a further discussion of this issue, see Stephen B. Bright &
Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the PoliticsofDeath:Deciding Between
the Bill ofRights and the Next Election in CapitalCases,73 B.U. L. Rev.
759 (1995).
50
Matthews, 105 F.3d at 910.
51 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
52
Id. at 204.
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prosecution is exercising its peremptory challenges to acquire a fair and
impartial jury, not for racially discriminatory purposes. This presumption, however, can be overcome when the defendant shows that the
prosecution has systematically challenged prospective jurors on the
basis of race. 53 Swain, therefore, provides defense counsel with a legal
basis for establishing an Equal Protection Clause claim for racially
discriminatory practices by the prosecution through evidence of specific
acts over time.

53

54
Intentional discrimination based on race is reprehensible. It is
even more so where the life of the accused is at stake. Counsel should not
hesitate in an appropriate case to undertake the issues and questions
authorized by Swain.

Summary and analysis by:
Deborah A. Hill

54

Id. at 223-24.

See case summary of Hoke, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.

MUELLER v. MURRAY
252 Va. 356,478 S.E.2d 542 (1996)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
HOLDING
In the early morning hours of October 6, 1990, ten year old Charity
Powers was abducted from a fast food restaurant near the skating rink
where her mother had earlier dropped her off. Her body was found the
following February buried 900 feet from the home of Everett Lee
Mueller. During interrogation, Mueller confessed to enticing Powers
into his car with the promise of a ride home; instead, he took her to his
house. Mueller claimed that Powers consented to sex with him and that
afterwards he strangled her to keep her from reporting the incident. The
state's evidence, however, tended to prove that Powers was raped and
that her throat had been slit.1
The jury found Mueller guilty of capital murder, rape, and abduction
with intent to defile.2 At the sentencing phase of the trial, four women,
including Mueller's sister, testified that they had been raped by Mueller.
Mueller had been convicted of two of these rapes. Mueller's own expert
testified that he lacked a "working conscience." 3 Mueller was sentenced
to death based upon the jury's finding of both "vileness" and "future
4
dangerousness."
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the judgment, 5 and the
United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. 6 Mueller then
petitioned for state habeas relief; his petition was dismissed in part and
denied in part. The Supreme Court of Virginia granted review but limited
it to the issue of whether Mueller's constitutional rights were violated by
the trial court's refusal to inform the jury that Mueller would be
7
ineligibile for parole if he received a life sentence.

The decision in Teague was intended, in the interest of finality and
federal-state comity, to prevent application of "new" rules of criminal
procedure to defendants whose convictions were final before the new
rule was announced.11 The Supreme Court stated that "a case announces
a'new 'rule if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final." 12 Teague requires a three step
analysis: first, determining whether the defendant's conviction became
final before the date on which the new rule was announced; second,
surveying the legal landscape as of the date of final conviction to
determine whether a state court examining the issue at that time would
have felt compelled by precedent to conclude that the rule was constitutionally required; and finally, the court must decide whether the new rule
falls within one of two narrow exceptions to the Teague doctrine.

I Mueller v. Murray, 252 Va. 356,358-60,478 S.E.2d 542,544-45
(1996),
2
1d. at 360,478 S.E.2d at 545. The capital murder convictions were
based upon Va. Code § 18.2-31(5) (murder in commission of a rape) and
former Va. Code § 18.2-31(8) (murder of child under 12 in the commission of an abduction with intent to defile).
3
Id.
4Id.
5Muellerv. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 386,414,422 S.E.2d 380, 398
(1992).
6
Mueller v. Commonwealth, 507 U.S. 1043 (1993).
7Muellerv. Murray,252 Va. 356,358,478 S.E.2d 542,544 (1996).

8512 U.S. 154, 162 (1994) (ruling that the defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the state's evidence of future dangerousness with
the fact that the defendant would be parole ineligible if sentenced to life
instead of death).
9489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (finding that habeas prisoners generally
not entitled to benefit of new favorable Supreme Court decisions).
1
OMueller, 252 Va. at 367,478 S.E.2d at 549.
11 Id. at 361, 478 S.E.2d at 546 (explaining that Teague and its
progeny have determined that the defendant's conviction becomes final
on the date of denial of certiorari or of other final disposition by the
United States Supreme Court).
12 Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.

The Supreme Court of Virginia held that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Simmons v. South Carolina8 was a "new rule"under
Teague v. Lane,9 and that consequently Mueller was not entitled to the
benefit of the Simmons holding. The court affirmed the lower court's
denial of Mueller's petition. 10
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
1.

Teague Analysis

